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Collective Bargaining Units in the Health
Care Industry: The NLRB and
Rulemaking
I.

INTRODUCTION

She worked as a floor nurse for most of her career. She had no
voice with which to get more money for her work. She had no voice
to ask for, demand or bargain with management for benefits, better
conditions, better working hours and possibly, career advancement.
Unionization in the hospital was something she believed she would
never see. Striking for personal gain was something she never thought
she would do. If she did, as many other nurses who have organized
across the country had already done, who would take care of the
patients? What would happen to them?
Many believe that unionizing in the health care industry has
helped to alleviate some of the problems that have existed within the
system, including low wages for employees and the lack of an adequate
"voice" for employees to air their grievances to management.' The
National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA) allows employees
to organize into groups and, through such organized groups, to deal
2
collectively with management with respect to employment issues.
These organized groups, or bargaining units, generally represent a
portion of the workers, to the extent that those workers have similar
training, skills, responsibilities, and pay.'
Because of the costs involved in negotiating with individual units
and the difficulties in determining which bargaining units should be
recognized, hospital management has been unreceptive to the intro-

1. Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units , 70

VA.

L. REV. 353, 354-55

(1984). Unions supply their members with many 'goods': wages, seniority rosters,
safety in the workplace, arbitration for grievances, and certain conveniences. These
'goods' are collective in nature, which means all individuals of a union benefit from
the unions' actions. Id.
2. ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1 (1976).
3. JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 24-25
(1988).
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duction of labor unions and bargaining units. 4 Consequently, the
problem of defining appropriate collective bargaining units in the
health care industry has led to protracted and frequent litigation5

before the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB or
board). 6 In 1987, the NLRB announced its intention to engage in
rulemaking to determine the appropriate number of bargaining units
in the health care industry. 7 Approximately two years after that
announcement, the NLRB issued a final rule, which it promulgated
to clarify the ambiguities and inconsistencies in defining bargaining

units.'

Prior to promulgating this rule, the NLRB generally relied on a
case by case approach in determining bargaining units. The resultant
unprecedented litigation over which hospital employees should bargain
together, however, awakened the NLRB's dormant rulemaking pow-

ers. 9 This was an effort by the NLRB to create a substantive standard
to determine appropriate units.' 0
This comment explores the validity of the NLRB's determination

of eight presumptive units and ultimately supports the determination.

4. See Leslie, supra note 1,at 381. The NLRB determines which units are
appropriate. If management voluntarily recognizes a union, the NLRB will not play
a direct role. It is when there is a refusal on the part of the employer to recognize a
particular unit that often creates the need for the NLRB to determine the appropriateness of the unit. Id. at 381.
5. See generally American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.
1990), aff'd, -. U.S. -, Ill S. Ct. 1539 (1991); NLRB v. Walker County Med.
Ctr., 722 F.2d 1535 (l1th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Res-Care, 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir.
1983); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1979). These cases
are examples of the disagreements that have existed between labor and management
and the methods of determining which bargaining units are appropriate within hospital
settings.
6. The NLRB consists of a five member board which is appointed by the
President and is responsible for administrating the process by which employees seek
to form unions and collectively bargain and administrating unfair labor provisions.
GERALD BERENDT, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16-18 (1984).
7. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987). This notice
of proposed rulemaking allowed a time period for filing responses and comment to
the proposal. Id.
8. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30).
9. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 156 (1982).
("[Tlhe Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind,
...such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter [29 U.S.C. sec. 151-58, 159-681.").
10. Kathleen A. Curran, Note, The National Labor Relation Board's Proposed
Rules on Health Care Bargaining Units, 76 VA. L. REV. 115, 115 (1990) ("Substan-

tively, the rules address and clarify the uncertainty that has existed since 1974 over
the problem of determining appropriate bargaining units . .

").
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In order to develop the background for the subject controversy, part
II reviews the legislative history surrounding the NLRA and its
amendments. Part III examines the judicial interpretations of the
NLRA which attempted to determine appropriate units prior to the
promulgation of the new rules. Part IV discusses the newly promulgated rules and standards for defining bargaining units and analyzes
the Seventh Circuit's response to a recent challenge to the rules. Part
V discusses and analyzes the bargaining units contained in the new
rules, and explores the appropriateness of these units. Part VI concludes that there is a sound analytical foundation for the continuation
of the units, as they will work to stabilize the health care industry
while providing consistency for employees to unionize and bargain
collectively.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SURROUNDING THE BARGAINING UNIT
DETERMINATION

The NLRA is the primary law that controls labor relations in
private industry. This Act developed in three stages. The first stage
commenced with the passage of the Wagner Act" in 1935. The Wagner
Act was intended to promote employees' rights to unionize for the
purposes of collective bargaining.' 2 Some considered the Wagner Act
to be protectionist and biased in favor of employees, since it not only
gave employees rights to organize, bargain and strike, but facilitated
the exercise of these rights.' 3 This Act also established the NLRB and
gave the Board the power to remedy unfair labor practices and
determine issues of representation.' 4 Furthermore, it empowered the
5
NLRB to order employers to remedy unfair labor practices.'
The second stage in shaping the NLRA began in 1947, when
Congress amended the NLRA to create a more balanced approach to
regulating employer/employee relations.' 6 The amended act was known
11. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. secs. 151-69 (1982)).
12. See generally the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. sec. 151-69 (1982). The Wagner Act is
protectionist toward employees to prevent employers from undermining their rights.

See Curran, supra note 10, at 115 n.5.

13. American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705 (N.D. 11. 1989),

rev'd, 899 F.2d 651 (7th cir. 1990). See also Curran, supra note 10, at 116.
14. Curran, supra note 10, at 115 n.5.
15. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
16. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, chap. 120, 61 Stat. 136

(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. sec. 141-88 (1982)); see also NLRB v. ResCare., Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Taft-Hartley applied some brakes,

so that the balance of power between companies and unions would not shift wholly
to tlie union side.").
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as the Taft-Hartley Act and it addressed the perceived abuse of power

by the unions. The Taft-Hartley Act also proscribed a range of unfair
labor practices so that employees would not be coerced into union
activity. 11
The Taft-Hartley Act attempted to establish a balance of powers

between labor and management.'" Whereas the Wagner Act appeared

to favor employees and unions, the Taft-Hartley Act sought to limit
union power, and to prevent the NLRB from becoming overzealous

in regulating employers. 19 The result of these two acts balanced the
needs of employees, employers, and unions.20 The Taft-Hartley Act
also contained express language excluding not-for-profit hospitals

from its coverage. 21
In 1974, Congress again amended the NLRA, adding what are
known as the health care amendments. These amendments accom-

plished several objectives, including removal of the exemption for
not-for-profit hospitals, and addressed the issue of bargafirning units

in the health care industry.22 Congress amended the NLRA to address

hospitals in an effort to protect employee rights and stabilize the
health care delivery system. 23 The amendments applied equally to all

hospitals, because, as one commentator noted, over half of all hospital

workers were employed by not-for-profit hospitals, yet were not
protected by the NLRA. 24 This lack of protection often resulted in
17. The Taft-Hartley Act, chap. 120, 61 stat. 136, 141-43 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. secs. 141-88 (1982)). See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 5 ("The
years after 1935 witnessed .
some corruption and undemocratic practices in internal
union affairs.").
18. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 5. The original Wagner Act, in favoring unions,
did not afford any protective measures to employers, but protected employees. This
created an excess of bargaining power on the side of unions. The Taft-Hartley Act
was designed to give employers and unions equal bargaining power. Id.
19. See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
20. Id.
21. 29 U.S.C. sec. 152 excluded "any corporation or association operating a
hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual." See 29 U.S.C. sec. 152 (1982).
22. Health Care Institutions Act, chap. 120, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at 29
U.S.C. sec. 152 (1982)). Congress included not-for-profit hospitals because "[it] could
find no acceptable reason why
employees of ... non-profit, non-public hospitals
... should continue to be excluded from the coverage and protections of the Act."
S. CONF. REP. No. 988, 93rd Cong., 2d sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N
3946, 3948.
23. Ira M. Shepard, Health Care Inst. Labor Law: Case Law Developments,
1974-78, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2 (1978).
24. Mary E. Sciarra, Comment, The Nonproliferation Mandate and the Ap-
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25
lower wages and poorer working conditions in these institutions.
During the 1974 Congressional amendment discussions, Senator Alan
Cranston 26 stated that the exclusion of not-for-profit hospitals from
the NLRB resulted in lower wages, low employee morale and poor

working conditions .27

When amending the NLRA in 1974, Congress was faced with the
problem of addressing the unique nature of the health care industry.
Unlike many other occupations, health care services are absolutely
essential. In regulating health care unions, the need for employee
protection and advancement must be weighed against the potential
disruption in patient care that could result when strikes occur. 28 The
House and Senate committees recognized that a disruption in the
health care delivery system is more serious by comparison than a
break in production at an industrial plant, because the health and
welfare of patients could be compromised by a strike. 29 In order to
prevent the potential for serious interruptions in the delivery of health
care, and eliminate the not-for-profit exemption so as to improve
working conditions for employees of these facilities, some committee
members made various proposals.
The most noteworthy proposal was submitted by Senator Taft.
Senator Taft introduced a bill that would have prevented more than
four bargaining units in health care facilities. 30 The rationale for this
proposal was a desire to protect the health care industry from fragmentation due to strikes, but still allow employees to organize and
collectively bargain under the mandate of the NLRA. However, the
Taft bill was not adopted by Congress, and there were no subesequent
propriate Legal Standard in Health Care Bargaining Unit Determinations, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663, 671 n.39 (1983).
25. Id. at 672 n.43 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 12,937 (1974) (statement of Senator
Williams), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT

HOSPITALS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 93).
26. Democrat from California.
27. 120 CONG. REc. 937 (1974). This change was expected to remedy these
problems by extending the benefits of the Act to all hospital employees, not just forprofit hospital employees. Id.
28. See Sciarra, supra note 24, at 673 ("Disruptions caused by organizational
drives and recognitional strikes in the health care setting ... were thought by
Congress to threaten the quality and delivery of life-sustaining services.").
29. St. Vincents Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977) (The committee
members recognized that inventorying health-care is impractable.); see also Curran,
supra note 10, at 124.
30. S. Comm. 2292,

93d Cong.,

1st sess. 5 (1973)

professional, technical, clerical and service, and maintenance).

(Proposed units were
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modifications in the bargaining unit section of the NLRA. 3'
Although Congress chose not to modify or set a number of
bargaining units for the health care industry, it did express fears of
the possibility of undue proliferation of bargaining units (which is the
creation of too many units). This fear of proliferation was justified
in part by the special nature of the health care industry and the
seriousness of disruptions in patient care. It was also justified by the
large number and diversity of job classifications within a hospital,
which makes the creation of too many units a potential problem.
Congress' fear of proliferation was not directly addressed by the
NLRA.32 Instead, Congress addressed this issue in the committee notes
with an admonition to prevent undue proliferation of bargaining units
in the health care industry (herinafter congressional admonition).3 3
This admonition provided:
Due consideration should be given by the Board to prevent
undue proliferation of bargaining units in the health care
industry. In this connection, the committee notes with approval the recent Board decisions in Four Seasons Nursing
Center, 208 NLRB No. 50, 85 LLRM 1093 (1974) 34 , and
Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB No. 144, 84 LRRM 1075
(1978) 31, as well as a trend towards broader units enunciated
in Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 NLRB No.. 170, 83
LRRM 1242 (1973).36
Congress acknowledged that a wide diversity of specialized groups
creates a potential for labor unrest. Such diversity exists in the health
care industry. In the event of labor unrest, fragmentation of the
31. 29 U.S.C. sec. 159 (1982). This section is not directive in the actual number
of units to be approved, but provides language which gives the Board the right to

decide "in each case," the number of units that will be approved for purposes of
bargaining. Id.
32. 29 U.S.C. sec. 151-69 (1982).
33. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d sess. 5 (1974). For a discussion on the
admonition see Curran, supra note 10, at 123-25.

34. A maintenance unit in a nursing home was found not to be a distinct group
that had separate interests from those of other housekeeping and maintenance units.
35. A unit of x-ray technicians was not found to have a separate community

of interest from the employees of other technical employees (such as laboratory
technicians and respiratory technicians) in a hospital.
36. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d sess. 5 (1974). Congress did note that it
did not adopt all of the views enunciated in Extendicare of West Virginia. The units
in Extendicare were very broad and left open much ambiguity that most likely
Congress did not want to completely approve of very broad units as a general rule.
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health care delivery system could follow. 3 The Seventh Circuit has
noted that if a key unit in the health care delivery system called for
a strike, the entire system could easily be crippled."

Despite this

potential, Congress did not amend the NLRA to limit the number of

bargaining units, and provided no guidance for alleviating the potential problem other than the admonition in the committee reports.
Neither the NLRB nor the courts have been consistent in applying the
39
NLRA or the admonition.
III.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL RRESPONSE TO THE NLRA

AND ITS AMENDMENTS IN TERMS OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

The overriding issue in many of the post-1974-amendment cases
was whether the courts have taken the congressional admonition into
consideration when determining the appropriateness of a particular
bargaining unit. Some courts have chosen to interpret the admonition
as controlling, and have refused to enforce an NLRB decision because
the Board did not explicitly take the congressional admonition into

account/ ° The basis for these decisions is that the Board must consider

the congressional admonition, and directly discuss and justify how
the action by the NLRB was consistent with that directive. 4 1 The
NLRB and courts have made bargaining unit determinations in the
37. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1469 (7th Cir. 1983). The
court here noted that "[e]mployers prefer fewer, rather than more, collective bargaining units . . . ." Id. This is so because if the units are larger and fewer, there
are more employees needed to call a strike than if there were more units. It takes a
certain percentage of the membership total to call a strike, so the larger and fewer
the units, the lessened possibility for rampant striking. Id.
38. Id. at 1470.
39. Compare IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(refusing to interpret the admonition as part of the statute or as controlling) with
Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) (reading the admonition
as controlling, to be considered to its fullest extent).
40. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[C]ourts
of appeal have declared in no uncertain terms that the Board must take heed of the
congressional admonition . . . when deciding upon appropriate units in health-care
institutions.") (quoting Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 887 (1978) (Penello,
Member, dissenting)); see also Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.
1976) (Board failed to comply with the admonition, so enforcement was denied). But
see IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that while committee reports discuss proliferation, the language of the NLRA itself
was not changed, and extra-statutory materials can never serve as independent sources
of law).
41. Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1980) (Board
must expressly give consideration to the admonition.).
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health care industry with an eye to the delicate nature of health care
and the potential for patient care disruption in the event of labor
disputes.
A.

42

THE COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS STANDARD

In bargaining unit determinations 4 for other industries, the NLRB
has applied what is commonly known as the "community of interests"
test. 44 This is a method of grouping employees whose "similarity of
functions and skills create a community of interest such as would
warrant separate representation. ' 4 In applying this test, the NLRB
examines the similarity of wages and hours, whether and to what
extent common supervision is present, whether there is any type of
integration with other employees, geographical proximity, and simi-

larity in the training and skills of the employees." After considering
these criteria, the NLRB decides if there are sufficiently common or
similar factors to warrant separate representation.
In examining bargaining units in the health care industry under
the community of interest standard, the NLRB must balance the
congressional admonition with the needs of the parties involved. 47 The
NLRB has found the community of interest standard the most appropriate in other areas of labor relations, 48 and has justified the use of
this standard in the health care industry. The board has justified the

42. John M. Husband, Determining Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health
Care Institutions - The Gap Widens, 40 LAB. L.J. 780, 781 (1981) ("[T]he vital
nature of medical care to the public and fact that hospital care is not storable . .
accounts for the sensitivity the NLRB should display to the health care industry.).
43. Unit determinations are a result of a dispute between employer and employees over which employee groupings shall be units that the employer will bargain
with. See Thomas J. Wiencek, Comment, Bargaining Unit Determinations in the
Health Care Industry - The Gospel According to St. Francis II, 1985 DET. C.L. REV.
67, 68-69 (1985) (citing K. MCGUNEss, How To TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

105-27 (4th ed. 1976)).

44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 428 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1981) (The
traditional test developed to assist the Board in making appropriate unit determinations.).
45. IBEW Local 474, 814 F.2d at 703 (quoting American Cyanamide Co., 131
N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961)).
46. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 973 (3d Cir. 1979); see
also GORMAN, supra note 2, at 69 ("[C]ommunity of interest is a vague standard
which does not readily lend itself to mechanical application.").
47. Watonwan Mem. Hosp., Inc., v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1983) (The
Board may utilize community of interest standards, but must give consideration to
the admonition to prevent undue proliferation.).
48. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 2, at 68-69.
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use of this test by pointing out the lack of specific language in the
NLRA directing the NLRB to adopt a particular standard. 49 Congress
had the opportunity to amend the NLRA to require the use of a
standard other than the traditional community of interest standard,
but declined to take such action. Instead, Congress left the decision
to the discretion of the NLRB.S0
One court, in determining the appropriate test, expressed concern
over the NLRB's lack of express consideration of the congressional

admonition. 5' These concerns over the Board's mere mention of the
admonition, but its lack of application of the admonition to unit
determinations, led to the development of alternative standards for
2
bargaining unit determination .
B. THE ST. FRANCIS I STANDARD: A TWO TIERED APPROACH
5 3 (St. Francis I), a new approach to
In St. Francis Hospital,
bargaining unit determination was made by the NLRB. In this case,
the NLRB upheld the designation of a bargaining unit for maintenance

personnel.5 4 St. FrancisI established a two tiered approach for determining units based on a division of the health care environment into
seven general categories." These categories were physicians, registered
nurses, other professional employees, business office clerical employ-

49. IBEW Local 474, 814 F.2d at 714-15. ("While we recognize that the

committee reports ...

discuss proliferation of bargaining units in the health-care

industry, we stress that Congress, in the final analysis, never adopted a proposal to
modify section 9."); see also Curran, supra note 10, at 140.
50. See Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Doghouse - Can an Old Board
Learn New Tricks?, 24 SA DIEGo L. Rzv. 9, 10 (1987) (The NLRB should discharge
its basic statutory objective, fulfilling the essential objectives of the NLRA.).
51. Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1980).
This court examined congressional intent closer than the actual Act to determine that
the congressional admonition was necessary to determining units. Giving just lip
service mention of the admonition was not enough. Id.
52. Compare St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982) (announcing a new
two tiered approach balancing community of interest with the congressional admonition) with St. Francis Hosp. II, 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984) (favored a disparity of
interest standard).
53. 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
54. Id. The NLRB here upheld a bargaining unit determination for a group of
maintenance workers. After the unit elected the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers to represent them, the hospital refused to bargain with the union. The
hospital claimed this maintenance unit was inappropriate because under the 1974
amendments to the NLRA, the NLRB could not apply community of interest
standards. Id.
55. Id. at 1029.
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ees, service, maintenance employees and skilled maintenance employees. 56 In the first tier, the Board requires that a proposed bargaining
unit be placed in one of the seven general categories. The employees
in the unit must have a broad enough job description to fit into one
of these groups. 7 Once the appropriate category is established, the
NLRB then applies the traditional community of interest standard to
determine whether the proposed unit has the same interests as other
units within the seven groups. If there are a significant number of
interests which are not the same as any of the seven general groups,
separate bargaining status may be obtained.58
This analysis balanced the "long established community of interest criteria ... against the legislative concern about over-proliferation
of health care bargaining units." 5 9 Applying the facts to the twotiered approach, the NLRB recognized the unit of maintenance workers as a separate bargaining unit.w6 However, The NLRB soon abandoned this approach for a different standard known as the disparity
of interests test.

C.

THE ST. FRANCIS II STANDARD: THE DISPARITY OF INTERESTS

TEST

The NLRB reconsidered its action in St. Francis 1PIand abandoned the two tiered approach in St. Francis Hospita6 2 (St. Francis
II). In this case, the NLRB adopted a new standard known as the
"disparity of interests" standard. 63 This new standard required "sharper
than usual differences (or 'disparities') between wages, hours, and
56. Id. These seven groups were chosen because the NLRB determined that

most employees would fall within these designations because of the nature of the
training and classification of health care employees.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 1029.
59. Id. at 1026.

60. Id.; see also IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(Discussed St. FrancisI and determined that the maintenance workers were separately
supervised, shared no duties with other labor employees at the hospital and there

was not an intermingling with other services.).
61. 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
62. St Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. at 949. (Case again brought back to the
Board after the hospital refused to bargain with the union of maintenance workers,
the unit deemed appropriate by the Board in the first case.).
63. See John G. Kilgour, The Health-Care Bargaining Unit Controversy:
Community of Interest versus Disparity of Interest, 40 LAB. L.J. 81 (1989). This

standard, working from a base of just two groups, professional and non-professional,
looks at whether the proposed unit is sufficiently different from one of the two
groups in order to create a separate bargaining unit. Id. at 88.
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conditions, etc. of the requested employees and those in an overall
professional or non-professional unit. . . ...This standard effectively
allowed only two bargaining units - professional and non-professional employees.6 5 The disparity of interest standard is more consonant with the congressional admonition because it limits the number
of presumptive units to two." In pronouncing this new standard, the
NLRB disallowed the maintenance unit it had previously upheld in
St. Francis 1.67

The labor union which represented the maintenance workers in
St. Francis II appealed the NLRB decision in InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 474 v. NLRB. 68 The appellate
court rejected the disparity of interests test put forth by the NLRB in
St. Francis II and determined that the NLRB had not justified its
standard as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. 69 The court also
stated that although legislative history may give meaning to ambiguous
statutory provisions, courts should not enforce principles that do not
7
have a statutory reference point . 0
The NLRB and the courts have applied either a community of
interest standard 7' or a disparity of interest standard. 72 This resulted
64. St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. at 953 (parenthetical in the original). The
Board noted that the maintenance workers shared the same conditions as service
employees, who were a larger group. Maintenance workers were also lesser skilled
individuals who worked with service employees. Id. at 954.
65. IBEW Local 474, 814 F.2d at 709 (discussing St. FrancisII).
66. Id. (The court in St. Francis II implied thai this test was mandated by the
1974 amendments "either without regard to the standards enunciated in section 9 [of
the NLRA] or as a supervening standard for employees in the health-care industry.").
67. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954.
68. 814 F.2d 697 (D.C Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 709.
70. Id at 712-13. The NLRB's suggested formula in St. Francis II relied solely
on legislative history without regard to the language in section 9 of the NLRA which
gives the NLRB the discretion to determine appropriate units. The admonition against
proliferation was contained only in the committee reports, Congress never changed
the wording of the Act itself. Although the 1974 amendments did not modify sec. 9
of the NLRA, the NLRB's decision suggests that unit standards were changed with
the amendments. Id.
71. See generally Watowan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1983) (using community of interest standards balanced with the congressional admonition); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983) (using community
of interest standards); Woodland Park Hosp. 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973) (using
community of interest standards to invalidate a unit of x-ray workers).
72. See generally Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir.
1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
disparity of interests test).

144
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in many inconsistent decisions because the two standards vary in their
interpretation and the weight the NLRB or the court gives to the
congressional admonition. Effectively, because the case by case approach which had been used was inconsistent and subject to individual
determinations, the NLRB decided to use its rulemaking power to
determine appropriate bargaining units.

IV.

THE

NLRB'S

DECISION TO ENGAGE IN RULEMAKING AND THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT CHALLENGE

By specific provision of the NLRA, the Board has the authority
to make rules to carry out its functions.73 This rulemaking authority
is given to federal agencies to assist them in carrying out the provisions
of various acts, and agencies can utilize this authority either by making
74
decisions through case by case determination, or by rulemaking.
A.

THE RATIONALE AND RESULT OF THE NLRB'S DECISION

In Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 75 the Seventh Circuit
suggested that the Board engage in rulemaking to promote consistency
76
and to prevent the "surprises" resulting from its case by case method.
The rules adopted by the NLRB are different from generalized
standards such as the community of interest or disparity of interest
tests, in that they firmly establish a set number of bargaining units
77
and prevent individual subjectivity and court interpretation .
There are advantages to formal rulemaking which make it justifiable. It often is more efficient than adjudication because it tends to
increase uniformity and stability and decrease costly litigation.7 1 It is
also a fairer process than adjudication because it supplies all interested
persons notice of policy changes that may affect them and allows an
opportunity to comment on that policy change. 79 Additionally, the
comment aspect of formal rulemaking assists in developing policies
73. 29 U.S.C. sec. 156 (1982). This section provides that the "Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." Id.
74. Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,144 (1987)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30).
75. 742 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 1093-94 ("The Board could have prevented surprise by using its
dormant rule-making powers.").
77. 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).

78. See Morris, supra note 50, at 34; Curran, supra note 10, at 145.
79. See Morris, supra note 50, at 37-38; Curran, supra note 10, at 146.
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knowledgeably and effectively. 0 Rulemaking frees the NLRB from
case law determinations which focus on facts and interests of specific
parties and away from "the broad needs and concerns of the entire
labor community."'" Finally, rulemaking brings some order to the
chaos which has surrounded litigation involving unit determinations
in the health care industry."
Regardless of the advantages of rulemaking, an examination of
the "in each case" language of 9(b) of the NLRA 3 suggests that the
NLRB must make unit determinations on a case by case basis, and
not resort to rulemaking. In fact, one Board member dissented from
the approval of rulemaking and declared that rulemaking was foreclosed by the language of section 9(b) of the Act.84 He argued that
employees' freedom to exercise their rights guaranteed by the NLRA
could be compromised by failure to determine bargaining units on a
case by case basis.8 5 He also argued that by the 1974 amendments,
Congress did not intend to have the NLRB abandon its forty-yearold approach to bargaining unit determination to adopt a new ap86
proach.
One court has argued that rulemaking will pre-determine units
7
and that this will violate the "in each case" language in the NLRA.
The NLRB noted, in its proposal to engage in rulemaking, that the
words "in each case" do not preclude the use of rules to make
bargaining unit determinations. The rules would merely classify the
appropriate unit but the actual unit would be decided in each case. 8
Congress could have prohibited the use of the NLRB's rulemaking
powers if it determined that it was necessary to do so. 89
80. Morris, supra note 50, at 29-30; Curran, supra note 10, at 146.
81. Curran, supra note 10, at 146; see also Morris, supra note 50, at 30.
82. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir.
1990), aff'd, -. U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
83. 29 U.S.C. sec. 159(b) (1982).
84. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,347 (1989).
85. Id. (The dissenter noted that if Congress had intended the Board to embark
on a radically different approach to determining units than what was traditional in
the industry, it would have said so explicitly.).
86. Id. Congress has usually expressed intentions to change. The plain language
of the NLRA must be be examined to determine congressional intent. Id.
87. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 711-12 (N.D. Ill.
1989),
rev'd, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).
88. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,144 (1987); see,
e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd,
U.S. __,
111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
89. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d at 656.
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The NLRB's decision to engage in rulemaking was originally
intended to alleviate what the NLRB perceived as a fragmentation in
the decision making process. 9° In the proposed rule, the NLRB stated
that rulemaking was a better device for avoiding proliferation than
the old standards because it gave a clear criterion for determining
which units were appropriate. 9
The NLRB defined appropriate bargaining units on the basis of
interests that are shared within the group, but disparate from the
interests of other groups. 92 Against this background, the NLRB balanced the congressional admonition against undue proliferation. 9
Through this process, the Board initially established a set of six
units: registered nurses, physicians, other professional employees,
technical employees, service and maintenance with clerical employees,
and guards. 94 The six units were deemed appropriate for larger acutecare hospitals. Smaller acute-care hospitals and nursing homes95 were
allowed the same units, except that due to the probability of less
division and specialization within the smaller hospitals, registered
96
nurses and doctors were included in an all-professional unit.
In the final rule, 97 the Board decided on eight bargaining units
that would be appropriate for the health care industry. These are: 1.
registered nurses, 2. physicians, 3. all professionals except for regis90. See, e.g., Notice to Engage in Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,142-43
(1987). The Board gave its first notice of intent to engage in rulemaking in 1987.
This was followed by a period of comment and discussion. The Board then gave its
second proposal to engage in rulemaking. During these time periods, many special
interest groups gave opinions and arguments for and against the rulemaking. It is
not surprising that the Final Rule noted that the number of opinions and arguments
from the hospital industry itself was large compared to other responses. This is
probably because of the large numbers of hospitals and their interests.
91. Notice to Engage in Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,143 (1987).
92. Id.; see, e.g., Masonic Hall v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1983).
93. Notice to Engage in Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,143 (1987)
(codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30).
94. Id. The NLRB stated the reasons that these six units were approved was
because most of the requests for bargaining units, aside from the statutorily mandated
unit of guards, generally fell into one of these six units, so these were felt to be the
most appropriate. Id.
95. A small hospital is defined as having 100 beds or less for patient care by
the proposed rules. Id.
96. Id. This distinction was in response to concerns from smaller hospitals that
they would be financially incapable of bargaining with many units as opposed to
larger hospitals. It also recognized the fact that smaller hospitals are unlikely to have
the number of members to create a unit. Id.
97. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30).
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tered nurses and physicians, 4. technical employees, 5. skilled maintenance employees, 6. business office clerical employees, 7. guards,
and 8. nonprofessional employees except for any named above. 9
While the Board did provide for the creation of additional bargaining
units "where extraordinary circumstances exist,'' 99 such determinations are to be made by the Board in an adjudicatory setting'0° and
are to be viewed strictly, with only extraordinary circumstances warranting the addition of another bargaining unit.' 0'
The final rule did not provide for a different structure for smaller
hospitals. 0 2 The NLRB based this decision on the lack of justification
by commentators to the proposed rule, and the NLRB's experience in
determining units for smaller hospitals. 013 It was further justified by
the creation of the "extraordinary circumstance" exception, which
would serve as a deterrent to undue proliferation of units.104
In the final rule, the NLRB addressed the congressional admonition by stating that Congress was nondirective on the issue of the
number of appropriate units within the statute. Therefore, principles
of statutory construction would indicate that this was to be within
the provinces of the NLRB. 01 Some commentators argued that the
Board ignored the legislative history by giving no effect whatsoever
to the admonition, aside from mere acknowledgement of its existence. 06 The NLRB's response to this contention was that the statutory
language of the Act was not changed in the 1974 health care amendments. 01 7 Further, the NLRB responded that although some concern
was expressed about numbers of bargaining units, no amendment was
98. 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).
99. 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (b) (1991).
100. Id.
101. Second Notice to Engage in Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932 (1988)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30) (The extraordinary circumstances exception
"allows for the possibility of individual treatment of uniquely situated acute care
hospitals, so as to avoid accidental or unjust application of the rule."); see, e.g.,
Curran, supra note 10, at 148-49.
102. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,341-42 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
sec. 103). However, the Board addressed small hospital concerns by excluding any
unit of five or fewer employees from strict application of the rule. Id.
103. Id. at 16,340-341.
104. Id. at 16,344-45.
105. Id. at 16,345-46.
106. Id. at 16,345 (Commentators addressing the NLRB during the rule discussions argued that congressional silence is no justification for the assigning of an
arbitrary number of units that are the largest ever approved in any industry.).
107. See Health Care Institutions Act, ch. 120, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at
29 U.S.C. 152 (1982)).
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made to determine these units. Consequently, Congress intended to
leave that determination within the discretion of the NLRB. 0
The NLRB stated that the units most likely to organize were
RNs, technical units, skilled maintenance units, service and unskilled
maintenance units, and business office clerical units.' °9 The Board
also noted that most physicians were independent and were not likely
to organize. The Board further stated that although guard units are
statutorily mandated,"10 there have not been many guard cases, because
of hospitals generally contracting out for guard services."' Congress,
in setting forth examples of undue proliferation in the NLRA, approved the decisions in Four Seasons," 2 Woodland Park,"3 and
Extendicare.1,4 These cases were examples of decisions consistent with
the congressional intent." 5 The Board, acknowledging the congressional admonition containing these decisions when promulgating its
rule, stated that it was fulfilling the purposes that Congress intended
when making unit determinations." 6 The newly promulgated rule was
challenged for appropriateness in the Seventh Circuit.
B.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CHALLENGE TO THE RULE MAKING

The new rulemaking analysis was first tested in the Seventh
Circuit decision of American Hospital Association v. NLRB." '7 In this
108. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345-46 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
sec. 103.30) (The NLRB stated that the comments by the legislators within the
committee reports of the 1974 amendments, although helpful, are not controlling or
directive.).
109. Id. at 16,346.
110. See 29 U.S.C. sec. 159(b) (1982) (The Act prohibits including any other
employees in a guard unit.).
111. Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. at 16,346. The NLRB felt that most hospitals
would not have the full number of units allowed by the rule, using the history of
litigation and the types of units which have in the past sought to bargain collectively.
Id.

112. 208 N.L.R.B. 403 (1974) (found inappropriate a three employee unskilled
maintenance unit in a nursing home).
113. 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973) (Board found inappropriate a separate unit of xray technicians).
114. Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1973) (Board found
inappropriate a separate unit of licensed practical nurses).
115. S. REP. No. 700, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974). The rules would prevent
such small and indistinguishable groups from being approved, which is the result
that Congress intended by approving these decisions, while not directing the NLRB
on any certain standard. Id.
116. Second Notice to Engage in Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,933-34
(1988).
117. 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).
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case, the American Hospital Association (the AHA) challenged the
NLRB's newly promulgated rule."' The district court had invalidated
the new rule after examining the history of the NLRA and its
amendments." 9 The court held that a case by case procedure in
determining units was more appropriate than rulemaking in light of
the congressional admonition to prevent undue proliferation and the
"in each case" language contained in the NLRA. 20 The court held
that the NLRB is not foreclosed from rulemaking in general.' 2'
However, this rule did not conform to the congressional admonition
to prevent undue proliferation. Therefore, the court granted a per22
manent injunction banning application of the rule.
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and upheld the NLRB's
authority to determine collective bargaining units through rulemaking.123 The court read the Act as favoring employees and their rights
to organize, although the NLRA is non-directive on the issue of the
number of appropriate bargaining units. Hence the court understood
24
the NLRA to favor many, rather than few bargaining units.
118. American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
rev'd, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990). The AHA sought to permanently enjoin the
NLRB from enforcing 29 CFR part 103 by attempting to invalidate it on three
grounds. First, the AHA stated that the rule does not follow the congressional
admonition against undue proliferation. Second, the AHA determined that the new
rule contravenes section 9(b) of the NLRA, which states that unit determinations
must be made "in each case". Third, AHA claims that the rule is arbitrary and
capricious. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 710-11. According to the court, the admonition precluded the NLRB
from issuing rules in the health care industry. The district court stated that the
dispute rested on the meaning of the "in each case" language. "When the words of
a statute are vague, so that a resolution cannot be gleaned from the words of the
text, we must determine which interpretation would advance the legislative purpose
the best." Id.
121. Id. at 711.
122. Id. at 714. The court stated, "[T]he rule mandates automatic fragmentation
of the workforce into eight units, without regards to the nature and extent of the
health-care services rendered or the dynamics of a particular health-care institution."
Id.

123. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111
S. Ct. 1539 (1991) (The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the hospitals' objection to
recognizing more than the statutory minimum of three units was really saying that it
would object "to any rule at all, since no rule is necessary to confer rights already
conferred by the statute.").
124. Id. at 654 ("[Tlhe precise balance among the competing interests is certainly
not spelled out in the statute; it is for the Board to decide."); accord Continental
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The Seventh Circuit also examined the legislative history of the
"in each case" language and found that the legislative committee
intended unit determinations to be made by the Board, and not by
Congress or the labor/management field.' 25 Congress enacted rulemaking powers in the NLRA at the same time as the section containing

the "in each case" language. Therefore, the court reasoned that
Congress would have specifically exempted rulemaking for bargaining
units had that been its intent. 126

The court, in interpreting the undue proliferation language in the

congressional comment, stated that it should be treated not as a

statute, but as an advisory concern which should not be given statutory
weight.' 27 The court justified its holding on the grounds that Congress
"does not legislate by issuing committee reports."'' 2s The court noted
that Congress had before it an example of New York State's counter-

part to the NLRB, which had recognized more than twenty-one units

in New York hospitals. 129 The court concluded that the congressional
admonition was directed more to this type of undue proliferation, or
to units in which the number of employees were too small. 30
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's
ruling,' holding that the NLRB's rulemaking powers are broad under

Web Press v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1099 (7th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc.,
705 F.2d 1461, 1469 (7th Cir. 1983).
125. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d at 713; see also H.R. REP. No.
972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist sess. 22
(1935). The House Reports say that "section 9(b) provides that the Board shall
determine ... [the appropriate unit]. This matter is obviously one for determination

in each individual case, and the only possible workable arrangement is to authorize
...the Board to make that determination." Id.; H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1935).
126. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d at 656 ("It is probable, no
stronger statement is possible, that Congress would have made an explicit exception
for unit determination if it had wanted to place that determination outside the scope
of the Board's rule-making power.").
127. Id. at 658; accord IBEW Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir.
1987); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1470 (7th Cir. 1983). But see Mary
Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 862-64 (7th Cir. 1980) (giving the
congressional admonition statutory weight).
128. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd,
-U.S. __,
111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991) ("Post-enactment legislative history ... is
sometimes a sneaky devise for trying to influence the interpretation of a statute

.") (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 658 (citing Hearings on H.R. 11357 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 300-01 (1972)).

130. Id. at 659 ("[Nleither the cases cited in the admonition nor the admonition
itself reads on the propriety of eight units.").
131. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, -U.S.
-, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
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the NLRA, and that the "in each case" language is not a limitation
upon the NLRB's powers.' The Court determined that the "in each
case" language simply indicated that the NLRB should resolve disputes whenever there is a disagreement over the appropriateness of a
unit. 3 3 The Court also held that the congressional admonition should
be read merely as a warning to the NLRB, since there is statutory
directive limiting the number of units, and there is every indication
that Congress intended the NLRB to make unit determinations.' 4
While the propriety of the NLRB's rulemaking has withstood challenge in the United States Supreme Court, the propriety of the
presumptive eight units remains in doubt.
V.

THE

PROPRIETY OF THE EIGHT UNIT PRESUMPTION

Other industries have determined appropriate labor bargaining
units by applying the community of interest standard. 35 In the 1970's
and early 1980's, numerous decisions in the health care industry
applied this community of interest standard to determine the appropriateness of a particular unit. 36 The NLRB's final rule defined the
eight groups, or units, as presumptively appropriate for collective
bargaining. These units are: 1.) doctors, 2.) registered nurses, 3.)
other professionals, 4.) technical employees, 5.) skilled maintenance
employees, 6.) business office clericals, 7.) guards, 8.) all other
nonprofessional employees. 3 7 A group of more than five employees
fitting into any of these groups creates a presumptive bargaining unit
with which the employer must bargain. 3
Evaluating the merits of the eight unit presumption requires an
examination of the work environment of the industry. Health care
workers must often deal with low wages, long hours, inadequate
benefits, and lack of autonomy. 3 9 These less desirable aspects of
employment exist in an industry that provides continuous care to the
nation's population in need of medical attention. A disruption in the
provision of medical services can be chaotic, if not life threatening,
132. Id. at 1542-44.
133. Id. at 1543.
134. Id. at 1545.
135. See BERENDT, supra note 6, at 68-69 (community of interest often primary
consideration).
136. See Kilgour, supra note 63, at 84-85 (outlining the early trend to rely on
traditional community of interest standards to make bargaining unit determinations).
137. 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).

138. Id.
139. BARRY R. FuRROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW 388-89 (1987).
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for the patients who rely on health care workers for treatment.
The most compelling justification for the congressional admonition is the goal of decreasing the potential for disruptions in patient
care. In no other industry could the effects of a strike be more
devastating. Unfortunately, these fears have resulted in bargaining
restrictions on health care workers, effectively backing them into a
corner and decreasing their bargaining power. 40 The answer to the
fear of proliferation, which increases the potential for disruption in
patient care, is not the prevention of adequate units with which to
bargain. A more logical approach, this author argues, is to examine
the units and determine whether or not they will meet the needs of
employees, without placing an undue hardship upon the employer.
In determining whether a particular unit may bargain collectively,
the NLRB takes into consideration a wide variety of factors: pay,
hours of work, benefits enjoyed, education, skills, integration with
other classes of employees, and functions of employment.14' A large
unit, which is favored by the employer because it is more cost effective
to bargain with, will also be more difficult to organize, due to the
competing interests of the workers involved and the diversity of skills
among these workers. 42 Employees and the unions favor smaller,
more cohesive units, which are more effective for addressing individual
employee concerns. Smaller units may increase employer costs to a
certain degree, simply because of the time it takes to negotiate with
each individual unit and the disruption caused by varying bargaining
43
cycles.
The eight unit presumption promulgated by the NLRB has not
been favorably received by some.' 44 There had never been, prior to
the new rule, more than eight units certified in one hospital at any
given time. 45 But the health care industry is diverse and has the

140. See, e.g., id. at 389-90.
141. See GETMAN'& POGREBIN, supra note 3, at 25.
142. See GORMAN, supra note 2, at 67-68.
143. Id.

144. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. I11.
1989),

rev'd, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding the eight unit presumption improper,

but reversed on appeal); see also John C. Kilgour, The Healthcare Bargaining Unit
Controversy: Community of Interest verses Disparity of Interest, 40 LAB. L.J. 81, 90
(1989) (pointing out "that the proposed [eight] units were somewhat different from
what the Board ha[d] approved in the past," abandoning the two unit approach of
the disparity of interest test).

145. Kilgour, supra note 144, at 90. (The Board returned to a standard allowing

as large a number of units as there has ever been in hospitals.).
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potential for creating far more than eight units. 146 Each employee
group wants to have its needs represented individually. 147 The eight
unit presumption is a reflection of the units that the NLRB had
48
certified in the past through case by case determination.
The fear of proliferation by presuming these units is unfounded,
when effect is given to the wide possibilities for other potential units
within the system. This author proposes that a hospital has the
potential of at least 20 different organizational groups. These may
include physicians, R.N.s, L.P.N.s, laboratory technicians, radiology
technicians,- phlebotomists, respiratory technicians, nurses aides, orderlies, dieticians, dietary aides, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians,
housekeepers, maintenance workers, clerical workers, medical records
technicians, administrative assistants, admitting personnel, security
guards, mental health technicians, counseling staff, and data processing workers. Each of these groups may be found in a relatively small
hospital. Although many of these groups share some similarities and
common interests, each group is unique in that it fills a special niche
within the hospital structure. Even within these groups, there are
degrees of specialization and training that may affect the monetary
compensation and status of the employee. "49 The above example
illustrates what true proliferation could do, and demonstrates that
eight units within a hospital is an appropriate number. The presumption ensures that all employees are given the opportunity to bargain

146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983); Woodland
Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973); Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 N.L.R.B.
1232 (1973). Many professional and non-professional units have attempted to be
certified as a bargaining units. These cases suggest that often it is more than undue
proliferation which creates or does not create a specialized unit. A balancing approach
between employers and employees is often the determining factor.
147. See, e.g., Kilgour, supra note 144, at 90-91 (It is difficult to organize large
units, especially when they conflict with groups that employees identify with.).
148. See NLRB v. Walker County Med. Ctr., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984)
(certifying a group comprised entirely of registered nurses); Watowan Memorial
Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1983) (approving group made up of all
technical employees); Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 261 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982)
(certified group of physicians); Faulkner Hosp., 242 N.L.R.B. 47 (1979) (maintenance
unit appropriate); Sutter Community Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 181 (1976) (unit of
business office clericals approved).
149. An example of this would be the nursing group. Within this profession,
nurses can be certified with specialties and thereby make themselves more marketable
and increase job status. The interests of these nurses may be very different than floor
nurses who have not specialized or pursued additional training. This author bases
this information on her experience as a registered nurse in the hospital setting.
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effectively, but that the number of units does not become too excessive.
A two unit determination, professional and non-professional, has
been proposed as being the most appropriate for the hospital industry.150 This author believes that this is an inadequate way to organize
the hospital system and secure collective bargaining. The adoption of
just two large units could render bargaining wholly ineffective. 5 '
One commentator suggests that a unit comprised of all professionals would be impossible and gives, as an example, the difficulties
that would arise from the standpoint of the largest professional group,
registered nurses. 152 These difficulties are in organizing and effectively
bargaining for large groups of diverse professionals. This would have
the effect of deterring many union organizers from attempting to
organize such a unit.'53 Nurses, who would be included in a group of
all professionals, would probably feel that their needs and skills are
sufficiently different from other professionals to require separate
representation.'5 4 A non-professional unit would be equally difficult
to organize because of the large numbers of employees it would
encompass and the extreme disparities among them.' Two units
cannot give employees effective access to bargaining and do not
account for the individual nature of the various worker in the health
care industry. An examination of each of the eight units as set forth
in the promulgated rule illustrates their appropriateness and justifies
their use as a presumptive unit.
Each of the eight units set forth in the new rule'56 has been found
appropriate by the Board in bargaining unit decisions. This author
believes that the eight units are the only presumptively appropriate
units, and approval of other units, absent extraordinary circumstances, would only create fragmentation and proliferation within a
given hospital. The units themselves can be justified on the basis of
150. St. Francis Hospital II, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 953 (1984). See generally John

M. Husband, Determining Appropriate Units in Health Care Institutions - The Gap

Widens 42 LAB. L. J. 781 (1981).
151. E.g., Kilgour, supra note 144, at 91.
152. Id. at 91 (suggesting that traditional nursing unions, who are affiliates of
the American Nurses Association, would probably not be able to organize such a
bargaining unit).
153. Id. at 91.
154. Id. at 91 (Nurses probably would not be receptive to representation by nonnursing unions.).
155. Id.at 91.
156. See infra notes 157-76 and accompanying text for a discussion on the units
approved by the Board.
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case law, NLRB decisions, and examination of the job requirements,
interests and interrelationships of the various job classifications within
the hospital.
One of the presumptive units under the rule is physicians.' Units
of physicians have been approved by the NLRB in pre-rule decisions.' 58
A unit of physicians is appropriate because of the similar interests
shared between physicians that are separate from other professionals.
These interests include liability issues, job responsibilities, educational
backgrounds and patient care expectations. These interests differentiate physicians from nurses and other hospital professionals. 5 9 Physicians have a distinct role in the health care setting, and are a
presumptively appropriate unit for the industry. Other health care
professionals also occupy a special role in the health care delivery
system.
Another professional unit approved under the rule is registered
nurses.160 R.N.s are a large, important group of hospital workers.
R.N.s are responsible for the direct, primary care of the patients in
the hospital. They occupy a special place in the workplace and have
issues that are unique to their group, such as career advancement,
shift and staffing concerns, wages, and patient care issues.' 6' The
NLRB also stated, when promulgating the rules, that non-nursing
professionals would lose their voice if included with a group of
R.N.s. 6 2 R.N.s generally do not have common supervision, background or licensing requirements compared to other hospital employees. 63 Therefore, R.N.s need to have separate representation due to
their unique role, and are a presumptively appropriate unit. There are
other professional employees within the hospital setting, but these
individual groups may not warrant separate representation.
Other professional employees, such as physical therapists, psychologists, counselors, pharmacists and speech therapists generally
157. See 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).

158. See Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 261 N.L.R.B. 569 (1982); Ohio
Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 230 N.L.R.B. 604 (1977).
159. See, e.g., Cynthia Sharo, AppropriateBargaining Units in the Health Care
Industry, 5 L.a. LAW. 787, 816 (1988) (Doctors earn more money, have different
interests and different input into patient care decisions.).
160. See 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).
161. See, e.g., Sharo, supra note 159, at 816 (nurses unique role exists because
of continuous patient contact and autonomy on the floor when necessary) (citing 179
DAILY LAB. REP. A-2 (Sept. 17, 1987)).
162. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,914 (1988); see also Sharo, supra note 159, at 816.
163. See NLRB v. Walker County Medical Ctr., 722 F.2d 1535 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(approving R.N.s as a separate bargaining unit).
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constitute much smaller, if not singular, groups within the hospital.
Because of this, the congressional admonition against undue proliferation would seem to apply and would suggest that these professionals be grouped into one unit for bargaining purposes.16 4 Creating
separate units for each professional group, this author argues, could
result in many small units, which would be in direct conflict with the
congressional mandate. A group of all remaining professional employees prevents an excess of small units, gives consistency to the
hospital environment, and avoids excessive fragmentation. Other employees, such as technical employees, have bargaining needs that are
different from the professional hospital employee.
Technical employees generally are comprised of such groups as
laboratory technicians, x-ray technicians, phlebotomists, respiratory
technicians and licensed practical nurses. Units of all technical employees consist of individuals who have similar salary scales, training
and job requirements. 65 Usually these technical employees have jobs
that involve some degree of patient contact, but are not in charge of
patient care.' 6 A separate unit of any one of the various groups of
technical employees would not be appropriate since their wages, shifts,
educational backgrounds, and duties are similar.' 67 Also, the potential
of creating many small units exists if all or some of the many types
of technical groups are allowed to bargain separately. The increase in
the numbers of units to bargain with leads to fragmentation and
undue proliferation. 68 A group of all technical employees satisfies the
need for adequate representation among employees of common backgrounds, while further complying with the congressional admonition.
The next unit approved by the rule is skilled maintenance employees. 6 9 Skilled maintenance employees include such groups as
boiler operators, engineers, painters, plumbers, powerhouse employees
and mechanics. If all of these employees were grouped according to
their individual skills, "[W]e could be faced with requests to find
appropriate dozens of separate units of employees performing diverse
164. See Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,341 (1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
sec. 103.30).
165. Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1983)
(affirming group of technical employees).
166. Id. at 851.

167. Woodland Park Hosp., 205 N.L.R.B. 888 (1973) (refusing to certify a
separate unit of x-ray technicians).
168. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
congressional admonition against undue proliferation.
169. See 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).
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... functions [and] such an approach can only lead to an undue
fragmentation of bargaining units .... "1o Thus, the special skills of
various maintenance employees, possibly warranting separate representation, must be balanced with the public interest in preventing
proliferation in the health care industry. 7 '
A balancing of these two interests suggests that all skilled maintenance employees be represented as one unit for bargaining. These
employees share commonalities such as wages, hours, and supervision,
and have similar needs to be addressed because of the nature of their
work. Also, the NLRB has rejected attempts to create units from
smaller groups within the maintenance umbrella.'72 Therefore, maintenance employees should be a presumptive unit to secure the bargaining needs of maintenance groups. This will prevent fragmentation,
which would result if small units within the maintenance group were
allowed. The final three presumptive groups, business office clericals,
guards, and all other non-professionals, were the last groups that the
NLRB determined were appropriate in the health care setting.7 3
Business office clericals perform duties which are obviously different from professional, technical and maintenance employees. Business office workers generally handle the financial and organizational
aspects of the hospital environment. Business office clericals are
supervised separately from other hospital workers and have different
educational requirements. 7 4 These workers also function fairly autonomously from other groups within the hospital setting, and have more
traditional working hours. For these reasons, a separate unit representing the needs of these workers is appropriate. Other non-professional employees are grouped together in what appears to be a "catch
all" unit to encompass remaining personnel. This unit appears to be
designed to prevent any fragmentation and creation of very small
units within a given hospital. A unit encompassing the remaining nonprofessional personnel resolves any potential conflicts early between
employees and employers by giving these employees a separate unit
170. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 808 (1975).

171. See St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating
that the Board should weigh traditional criteria with congressional mandate against
proliferation).
172. See id. (rejecting unit of four boiler operators); St. Joseph Hosp., 224
N.L.R.B. 270 (1976) (rejecting "maintenance and engineering department" in favor
of broader service and maintenance unit); Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children,
217 N.L.R.B. 806 (1975) (rejecting stationary engineer unit).
173. See 29 C.F.R. sec. 103.30 (1991).
174. See Sharo, supra note 159, at 817-18 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,92425 (1988)).
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with which to identify, but limiting any potential for many units to
form.'7 5 The unit of guards is a statutorily mandated unit which the
NLRB was obligated to recognize. 176
The Supreme Court has allowed the rules to stand, finding this
method of rulemaking preferable to the case by case method, which77
had not brought the NLRB any closer to defining appropriate units. 1
The eight units themselves, perhaps the basis for future challenges,
are the most efficient, appropriate and cost effective way to secure
bargaining for employees in the health care industry.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the decision to engage in rulemaking has not been applauded by many, it is the first time that the Board has sought to
bring organization and consistency to labor management in the health
care industry. The Supreme Court's approval of the new rules has
left one question unanswered: are the eight units themselves appropriate? In light of the structure of the health care industry, it was
necessary to create eight units to cope with the wide diversity which
exists within a hospital. The eight unit presumption will lead to more
stability within the system, while addressing the needs of individual
employees. Refusing to recognize any of the eight units will be
counterproductive for employers and will lead to dissention and
dissatisfaction among employees. Each of the eight units has in the
past been certified by the NLRB as appropriate through a case by
case determination. By recognizing these eight units, wide scale proliferation of specialized bargaining groups within the hospital will be
prevented and the hospital industry can finally escape from its bargaining woes.
RHONDA FERRERO-PATTEN

175. See, e.g., John Robert Shelton, Note, NLRB Guidelines for Determining
Health Care Industry Bargaining Units: Judicial Acceptance or Back to the Drawing
Board, 78 Ky. L.J. 143, 154 n.74 (1990) ("Based on our analysis of the evidence
adduced, we have found appropriate separate units of technicals, business office
clericals, and skilled maintenance employees. All remaining service and non-professional employees [except guards] shall, therefore, constitute a separate appropriate
unit, where requested.") (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,927(1988)).
176. 29 U.S.C. sec. 159(b) (1982) (providing that guards are to be maintained
in a separate bargaining unit).
177. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. See generally Ursula M.
McDonnell, Comment, Deference to NLRB Adjudicatory Decision Making: Has
Judicial Review Become Meaningless?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 653 (1989) (discussing the
NLRB's reluctance to use rule making to give consistency to the field of labor
relations).

